

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Korea
 SUBJECT Opinion on the Effectiveness of
 United Nations Propaganda in
 North Korea
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1. In an attempt to impress the North Korean populace with their unfavorable living conditions, too many United Nations leaflets tended to exaggerate the obvious. The result had a negative effect, in that the people tended to conclude that the leaflets were strictly lies and propaganda. A more effective method would have been to draw attention to the outstanding benefits in United Nations territory, allowing the North Korean readers to make their own comparisons.
2. None of the leaflets were designed to explain United Nations activity in South Korea. The majority of the North Koreans were under the impression that only the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force were fighting with South Korea, which was what they were told by the North Korean government. The people did not realize that the United Nations Command was composed of representative forces from many free countries. In addition, as a result of North Korean propaganda, they believed that the Chinese Communist forces and the North Korean army were invincible, that the full strength of the United States had been used on North Korea without being able to defeat them, and that the United Nations requested a cease-fire because their war power had been depleted.
3. Because of a lack of United Nations counterpropaganda, the populace and the front-line soldiers accepted the North Korean accounts of the progress of the war. The United Nations should have announced the victories attained by them. Because the people also believed the widespread germ warfare propaganda, leaflets to counter this theme should have been devised by the United Nations.

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4. Leaflets distributed over a general area to be bombed, as a forewarning to the civilian population to leave, would have been effective. Although the United Nations did broadcast messages warning the people to stay away from military targets, the messages did not get to them since the majority of the people did not own radios. Most of those who had radios did not bother to listen to them because the North Korean and Soviet broadcasts were so stereotyped.
5. The Safe Conduct Certificates dropped near the front lines were very effective. Leaflets similar to these should have been widely distributed.

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